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1 October 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

1 October 1959

### DAILY BRIEF


#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC


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
USSR: The substantial relaxation of jamming of Voice of America broadcasts to the USSR has continued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of VOA broadcasts intended for Eastern European audiences, however, has continued. In a talk with US officials on 15 September in Washington, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing the cold war!"

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\*USSR - Communist China: Soviet Premier Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful coexistence in his 30 September speech in Peiping is apparently designed to convey the impression to the West that he intends to maintain the atmosphere of detente by dissociating the USSR from Peiping's harder foreign policy line. His remarks that "we must do everything possible to

preclude war" and that "we should not attempt to test the stability of the capitalist system by force" vary markedly in tone from recent Chinese Communist pronouncements. Both Khrushchev and Soviet party presidium member Suslov, who spoke in Peiping on 28 September, reflected Moscow's continuing reluctance to endorse Communist China's current economic policies, although they made the usual affirmations of Soviet support and friendship. Both speakers avoided any reference to China's commune program and to the "leap forward," and Suslov's extended praise of Soviet industrial and agricultural technology appears to be an indirect suggestion to the Chinese that they would profit by adhering more closely to the USSR's methods in these fields.

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Watch Committee conclusions: [Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Iran.]

Laos: [Dissident activity has remained at a low level. The dissidents, however, with probable North Vietnamese assistance continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion of military operations.]

Middle East: [Mounting tensions in Iraq have increased the possibility of early attempts to assassinate or overthrow Qasim. Whether successful or not, such moves might well be followed by anarchy or civil war between nationalist and Communist forces. Under these circumstances, direct UAR involvement in Iraq, with a consequent increase in the danger of broader hostilities in the area, is possible.]

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Latin America - Communist China: [The top leaders of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Venezuelan Communist parties, who are in Peiping for the Chinese tenth anniversary celebration, each spoke at the formal opening ceremonies. The presence of these and other prominent Latin American Communist leaders provides an opportunity for Chinese officials to discuss with them new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America, and to review accomplishments since the last meeting of Latin American leaders in Peiping early this year. The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guidance of Latin American Communists, have stepped up their cultural and propaganda activity in the area in 1959.]

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Cuba: Prime Minister Fidel Castro's attack of 28 September on press and other critics of his revolutionary program revealed a concern over his increasing difficulties. His high praise of "Che" Guevara, whom he placed in charge of industrial planning, may reflect awareness of the distrust which many responsible Cubans feel for Guevara, who is generally regarded as pro-Communist. Castro may react vigorously to editorials on 29 September in leading Havana dailies which claim that freedom of the Cuban press is limited.

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### USSR Continues Selective Jamming

[Monitoring of Voice of America transmissions to the USSR reveals that the selective relaxation of Soviet jamming has continued since Khrushchev's departure from the United States. Jamming of all broadcasts to the Eastern European satellites has continued. During the period 25-29 September, 88 percent of Russian-language broadcasts, 86 percent of Latvian, 92 percent of Lithuanian, and 54 percent of Estonian were audible.]

[In a talk with US officials in Washington on 15 September, Yuri Zhukov, chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, said this relaxation of jamming was an "experiment" to see whether the VOA would cease "pursuing the cold war." He expressed hope that the US could halt transmissions by such anti-Soviet stations as Radio Baikal and Radio Free Russia and said if this were done the USSR would stop jamming altogether. He warned, however, that if results were "negative," jamming would be resumed.]

[Zhukov further said the Soviet Government was also prepared to enter into reciprocal agreements which would increase the circulation of Amerika and USSR magazines, open reading rooms in Moscow and New York public libraries, and implement the article in the US-Soviet exchange agreement concerning radio-television exchanges on political subjects.]

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Key Latin American Communist Leaders Gather in Peiping

[The presence of several prominent Latin American Communist party leaders at the Chinese tenth anniversary celebrations provides an opportunity for them to discuss with Peiping officials new tactical plans in furtherance of Chinese objectives in Latin America and to review their accomplishments since the last such meeting in Peiping early this year. Luiz Carlos Prestes, Victor Codovilla, and Jesus Faria, top officials of the Brazilian, Argentine, and Venezuelan parties respectively, spoke at the opening ceremony. Key representatives of the Colombian, Cuban, Uruguayan, Ecuadoran, Chilean, Panamanian, and Costa Rican Communist parties are also in Peiping, along with a number of non-Communist political, congressional, and cultural figures from several Latin American countries.]

[The Chinese, who are seeking to increase their role in the guidance of Latin American Communists, have registered some successes in the program they outlined to the representatives of 12 Latin American parties who met in Peiping after the 21st Soviet party congress in early 1959. These plans included increased Latin American travel to China, the training of Latin American Communists in China, and the development of a Chinese propaganda network in Latin America. Subsequently, a Chinese journalist delegation visited four Latin American countries, and the official New China News Agency has opened a branch in Havana and reportedly hired correspondents in Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Latin American travel to China during the first six months of 1959 far surpassed the total for all of 1958.]

[None of the 20 Latin American nations has diplomatic relations with Communist China. Cuba, however, recently became the first Latin American nation since 1952 to abstain in a United Nations General Assembly vote on the question of Chinese UN representation.]

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### Status Report on Cuba

Fidel Castro's preoccupation with growing economic problems which threaten the realization of his reform program have heightened his marked sensitivity to criticism and his reliance on trusted companions from active revolutionary days. This was particularly evident in his TV appearance on 28 September. Castro made prolonged attacks on Havana dailies which have questioned government actions and on the decision of the Inter-American Press Association to discuss whether freedom of the press exists in Cuba. Havana's leading newspaper, Diario de la Marina, which has Catholic and conservative backing, did not back down under the attack but charged editorially on 29 September that press freedom is limited by the revolutionary government in many ways short of censorship. It was, surprisingly, joined by other independent papers, in the first such strong and open exception to Castro's words since the revolutionary victory on 1 January.

In the same speech Castro emphasized his great reliance on "true revolutionaries," naming among others "Che" Guevara, whose strident anti-Americanism and suspected pro-Communism add to the general suspicion of him among Cubans. Castro announced that a government program for industrial planning would be headed by Guevara and that although private investment would be accepted, outside help was not really needed. A reference to "investigation" of two large US-owned nickel and cobalt plants at Moa Bay and Nicaro indicated that the government hopes to increase its income from them but has not yet decided by just what means.

Castro's drastic solutions are only complicating the economic problems arising from his reform program.

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